RazorsKiss on the
Christian God as the Basis of Knowledge
Part 6: RK on the Christian's "Certainty"
Originally published on Incinerating
Presuppositionalism on August 24, 2009.
Continued from Part 5.
* * *
In the opening statement of his debate with Mitch
LeBlanc,Christian
apologist “RazorsKiss” (“RK” hereafter) claimed that
Christians have the privilege of certainty
which implies that no one else does.
But privileges can be taken away.
Consequently, Christians cannot know with certainty when they can enjoy this
"privilege of certainty," and when they cannot. And given their
worldview’s premises, the recognition of the Christian's inherent uncertainty
on this matter is accurate.
This is because Christians affirm the existence of a supernatural consciousness
which can alter the nature of any thing which exists in the universe at any
time, without seeking the prior approval of believers before doing so. (What
believer would say that his god needs his approval to do anything?)
In essence, what RK calls “certainty” is based on proclamations inserted into
the mouth of a storybook character. But this can only undermine his profession
of certainty, not only psychologically, but also philosophically, since its
basis (even on Christianity’s own premises) is beyond the reach of the
believer’s epistemological grasp.
That the nature of this “certainty” is at best utterly fleeting and elusive for
the believer, is especially true given the context in which RK informs his
claim to certainty, namely that this is
a certainty based on the most fundamental
guarantor of truth.
That “fundamental guarantor of truth,” which, on RK’s worldview, can only mean the Christian god,
is no "guarantor" of certainty for the believer at all.
The granddaddy of presuppositionalism, Cornelius Van Til
himself, makes this clear when he writes:
God may at any time take one fact
and set it into new relation to created law. That is, there is no inherent
reason in the facts or laws themselves why this should not be done. It is this
sort of conception of the relation of facts and laws, of the temporal one and
many, imbedded as it is in the idea of God in which we profess to believe, that
we need in order to make room for miracles. And miracles are at the heart of
the Christian position. (The Defense of the Faith, p. 27)
Because Christians affirm belief in an omnipotent
supernatural being which can do what Van Til claims
here, they cannot bank on any fact with any certainty, for unless
they are themselves omniscient (which would make them “God,” and there can be
only one “God”), they cannot know if or when their god might take any
fact and “set it into new relation to created law.” The believer's god is
supposed to have a will of its own, independent of the believer's own will. So
how can the believer know if or when his god is going to cause another miracle
to take place, especially if he relies on "divine revelation" (i.e.,
information which his god chooses to distribute to the believer) for all his
knowledge?
For instance, a believer cannot be certain that the water he is drinking won’t
suddenly be turned into wine the instant he puts a glass of water to his lips.
Then again, on Van Til’s view, he might not even
notice that what he thought was water was turned into wine, because the facts
pertaining to his perception of such things have been “set into new relation to
created law.” He may be drinking wine and not know it!
The believer cannot assume that this is a matter of deception, since according
to Van Til it would merely be a matter of individual
facts being “set into new relation to created law.”
Since the Christian god is under no obligation to
its creatures, it has no obligation to give believers advance notice
that any facts are about to be “set into new relation to created law.”
So the Christian’s protestation that his god would not deliberately
"deceive" him in such a manner, would be
misdirected.
Moreover, protests from apologists that their god is “rational” and therefore
will not change things willy-nilly, miss the point of Christianity’s own
theological teachings.
If one affirms the existence of such a being, why suppose that it would be
irrational for it to change water into wine? Blank out.
Was it irrational for Jesus to turn water into wine at the wedding at Cana (cf.
John 2:2-11)?
If the Christian affirms that it was not rational for Jesus to change water
into wine, then he’s already admitting that he worships an irrational deity
anyway.
On the other hand, if the Christian affirms that it was in fact
"rational" for Jesus to turn water into wine, then such protests are
inapplicable. Whatever Jesus does, is "rational" because Jesus does
it. If Jesus decides that a car
should blow up and destroy human lives, it is "rational" simply
because Jesus decides this. If instead of turning water into wine, Jesus
decides that a
hurricane should blow into town and take 1836 or more lives, would the
believer call Jesus' decision "irrational"?
I trow not.
Similarly, if the believer affirms that Jesus’ miraculous transformation of
water into wine was rational at the wedding at Cana, then why suppose it would
be irrational for Jesus to do this or anything else on other
occasions?
Believers are caught in a pickle of their own doing here, and so long as they
remain committed to Christianity’s teachings, they’re simply stuck on this one.
So while RK may think that “Christians have the privilege of certainty,” it’s
clear that their worldview does not grant them any epistemic right to
certainty whatsoever (they get only "privilege"). They affirm
“certainty” in word only, with no objective support for their claim to
certainty at all.
Is this a reliable basis for epistemology?
If course it isn't.
To Part 7.
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