RazorsKiss on the
Christian God as the Basis of Knowledge
Part 3: RK's “No Brute Facts” Claim
Originally published on Incinerating
Presuppositionalism on August 19, 2009.
Continued from Part 2.
* * *
In the section of his opening statement
titled “Proper Epistemology,” RK basically just describes his position
as opposed to presenting a reasoned defense for it. After reviewing his
positional statement numerous times, I found no attempt to validate his overall
position with argument. Instead of presenting an argument for the view that the
Christian god is the basis of knowledge, RK preferred simply to assert it as a
component of two heavily laden confessional affirmations which he characterized
as “axiomatic, interrelated foundations” which, upon
examination, turn out not to be axiomatic in the least.
The failure to provide an argument for various assertions he makes in his
opening statement, is a trait common to much of what
RK affirms. For instance, he makes the following statements about “facts”:
there are no brute facts. Facts are not neutral
entities, and they cannot be interpreted in a neutral fashion. This is because
facts can only exist in relation to other facts; further, without exception
these are interpreted with reference to still other facts.
Here is a series of claims about facts which RK
makes but does not seek to establish by means of argument. Each statement which
RK makes here is in need of support, and neither statement seems to follow
necessarily from any of the others.
RK makes the universally negative claim that “there are no brute facts.” How
does he support this? He does so by asserting that “facts can only exist in
relation to other facts.” How does RK know this? He does not explain. This is
logically equivalent to saying that there is no fact anywhere which does not
exist in relation to other facts. While universally negative claims are
notoriously difficult to establish with certainty, even if we accept this to be
the case (and RK does not demonstrate this, he only asserts it), how does it
follow from this that “there are no brute facts”? RK does not explain this
either. Why can it not be the case that “facts can only exist in relation to
other facts,” but some of those facts are “brute” in nature? The issue here
seems to be one of definitions, but RK does not state his definitions. What
exactly is a “brute fact” as RK understands it? It may be the case that “there
are no brute facts,” but the reason which RK offers in support of this seems
insufficient to rule out their existence. It may even be the case that I would
agree that “there are no brute facts,” but only on premises integral to my
worldview, and RK has already made it clear in no uncertain terms that he would
reject my worldview. Given RK’s claims to exclusivity of Christianity and the
lines he has drawn in the sand against any non-Christian position, I would
expect that my own reasoning for rejecting the notion of “brute facts” would
fail to muster with RK’s position.
To understand RK’s position, we must know what he means by “brute fact.” For a
specifically presuppositionalist understanding of what a “brute fact” is, I
consulted John Frame’s A
Van Til Glossary, which, curiously, offers two
definitions for this expression:
(1) (in VT) fact
that is uninterpreted (by God, man, or both) and
therefore the basis of all interpretation; (2) objective fact: fact not
dependent on what man thinks about it.
Since RK himself seems to be a
presuppositionalist, I’m willing to suppose that he would endorse the
definitions of “brute fact” which Frame offers here. The question becomes then,
since Frame offers two definitions for this term: which definition does RK have
in mind?
If by “brute fact” RK means the second of these two definitions (“objective
fact”), then I’d say RK is in big trouble here. This would essentially be
affirming that all facts are subjective. Indeed, since
Christianity holds that all facts are created by an act of supernatural
consciousness (cf. Van Til, who claims that “God is
the creator of every fact” [Christian Theistic Evidences, p. 88; quoted
in Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic: Readings &
Analysis, p. 378]), then I would agree that this would accurately describe
the Christian (and thus RK’s) view of facts. According to such a view, facts
are dependent upon a knowing subject and conform to its will. In other
words, on this view, facts are subjective. This would mean that any
“fact” which RK cites on behalf of defending his worldview would be subjective
in nature, and thus as unstable as a straw hut in a Category 5 hurricane.
Moreover, if RK holds it to be a fact that “there are no brute facts,” then
this “fact” itself would be subjective. So why should anyone accept it as an
objectively reliable statement about reality? Blank out.
On the other hand, if by “brute fact” RK means the first of these definitions
(i.e., “uninterpreted” fact which serves as “the
basis of all interpretation”), then we need to understand what is meant by the
term “interpretation,” since it is used here in a rather idiosyncratic manner
(e.g., we interpret statements, symbols, language, bodily gestures, etc. rather
than facts per se). Here John Frame has something noteworthy to add:
To my knowledge, Van Til
never defines “interpretation,” but I gather he uses the term fairly broadly to
describe all of a person’s activity in his attempts to understand the world. (Cornelius
Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, p. 193)
Van Til used the term
“interpretation” with very high frequency in his writings. It seems
inexplicable if what Frame says here is true, that “Van Til
never defines ‘interpretation’,” given not only his frequent use of the term,
but also given Van Til’s own rhetorical question:
Is not the important thing that Christian
meanings be contrasted with non-Christian meanings? (The Defense of the
Faith, p. 23n.1)
At any rate, if “interpretation” denotes “all of a
person’s activity in his attempts to understand the world,” and “brute facts”
are facts which are “uninterpreted,” then “brute
facts” would be facts which have not (yet) been processed by “all of a person’s
activity in his attempts to understand the world.” Thus RK’s denial of the
existence of “brute facts” so conceived would also be problematic, for it
essentially denies that facts could exist independent of “a person’s
activity in his attempts to understand the world.” This assessment is
consistent with Frame’s first definition of “brute fact,” which he attributes
to Van Til, and which posits “brute fact” as “the
basis of all interpretation.” Thus RK’s denial of the existence of “brute
facts” again denies the objectivity of facts, and essentially rules out any factual
“basis of all interpretation.” If facts are not the basis of one’s
interpretation, what is? Feelings? Wishes?
Likes or dislikes?
The problem is even deeper for RK, for not only does he fail to follow through
with anything approaching a solid defense of his claim that “there are no brute
facts,” this claim, on either definition of “brute fact,” essentially amounts
to claiming that there is no factual objectivity whatsoever. Either the claim
“there are no brute facts” outright denies the existence of objective facts
(Frame’s definition (2)), or it denies the existence of facts which exist
independent of cognitive activity (which is just another way of denying the
existence of objective facts).
On the presuppositionalist view, facts are, in the final analysis, presumably
“interpreted” for all eternity, not things which are discovered by
consciousness. This basically entails the general view that any facts which man
discovers, were already known (“interpreted”) by a
supernatural consciousness. So RK’s “no brute facts” claim essentially follows
from the claim that the Christian god is omniscient (i.e., the Christian god’s
omniscience necessitates the view that “there are no brute facts”), as
opposed to a conclusion reached through an inductive investigation into the
nature of facts themselves. So this is not a validation of the claim, but
rather an indication of how it follows as a consequence of more fundamental religious
commitments, in spite of the philosophical problems it generates for the
Christian position. What is fundamental in such a case is a religious
confession of faith rather than a factual basis, which is denied by the
“no brute facts” claim itself.
It is not clear why RK felt the need to affirm such a self-discrediting
position, for it is unclear how it ties to any positive argument he may be
trying to make on behalf of the claim that “the Triune God of the Scriptures”
is “the basis for knowledge.” Then again, as indicated above, I did not find
any positive argument on behalf of this claim, which he elected to defend by
taking the affirmative in the debate.
RK did say that “knowledge is interrelated” and that “facts cannot be
interpreted outside of your epistemology,” but he nowhere explains why it must
be the case that “there are no brute facts” for these points to be true.
Certainly, rational knowledge is interrelated, since on the standard of
rationality (where “rationality” is the commitment to reason as one’s only
means of knowledge and only guide to action), new knowledge must be integrated
without contradiction into the total sum of one’s knowledge. Also, one needs an
epistemology (namely reason, as opposed to faith in revelations from
invisible magic beings) according to which he can perform such an activity. But
this does not in any way require that facts be subjective in nature, as RK’s
denial of the existence of “brute facts” seems to entail. Facts can certainly
be objective (i.e., have the identity they have independent of the cognitive
activity of a knowing subject), and still be identified and integrated by a
rational process into the sum of one’s knowledge without contradiction, so long
as one employs an objective method. But if there are no objective facts, as
RK’s position requires, then all bets are off.
RK continues, saying that “as philosophers, we have to consider the meaning of
the facts – or the concepts – we examine.” RK seems confused here. Meaning is a
property of concepts, not of independently existing concretes. For instance,
one does not pick up a rock and say it has “meaning” of its own. Only in the context
of other facts can we begin to speak of meaning with reference to a specific
concrete. For instance, if a certain kind of igneous rock were discovered under
several strata of sandstone, an inference could be made about a period of
volcanic activity. But strictly speaking, meaning is the domain of concepts. So
while I agree that “meanings are inseparable from our epistemological
foundation,” since a rational epistemology is conceptual in
nature and meaning is a property of concepts, RK fails to show how this
requires the existence of his god, or how it relates to such a demonstration,
which he had pledged to deliver in his debate. As I indicated in my
previous posting, the primacy of existence and the objective theory of
concepts are the fundamentals needed for such cognitive operations.
RK states that “we judge all facts through the ‘prism of our
epistemology’,” which is true if we have a unified, unfragmented
epistemology and we guide our thinking consistently according to that
epistemology. The question at this point, however, is: does this “prism of
epistemology” have an objective or subjective basis? An
epistemology which is subordinated to theistic affirmations is going to be
subjective in nature. This is because theism entails enshrinement of an
imaginary consciousness on which everything in the universe depends and to
whose will everything conforms. As we saw above, Christianity teaches that all
facts are created by a deity by means of conscious intentions, which means: the
subject in the subject-object relationship holds primacy over its objects. This
is the very essence of subjectivism, and it lies at the heart of theism as
such. Moreover, since no one can consistently employ a subjective epistemology
and survive very long, a theist is not going to operate on the basis of a
unified, unfragmented epistemology. Rather, he’s
going to have a mixed epistemology, which ultimately means that he will
not be able to defend any position consistently. It also means that, in order
to live in this world, the theist has no alternative but to borrow from the this-worldly epistemology of a rational (and therefore
non-theistic) worldview which he has verbally rejected.
By contrast, an epistemology which is founded explicitly on the primacy of
existence (i.e., the view that the objects of consciousness exist and are what
they are independent of the conscious activity of the subject) and which
benefits from the objective theory of concepts (as explained in Ayn Rand’s Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology),
then he has the makings of a truly objective epistemology, one which allows him
to recognize the objective nature of facts and enables him to identify and
integrate them into the sum of his knowledge in an objective manner to produce
a non-contradictory whole, which he can confidently and legitimately call
“knowledge.” Any compromise of either of these two components – the primacy of
existence and the objective theory of concepts – will result in a system which
invites the arbitrary and inclines its users to confuse what they imagine with
what is real.
For further discussion of the inherent antithesis between theism and
Objectivism on the nature of facts, see my blog Rival
Philosophies of Fact.
To Part 4.
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